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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews case law on arbitration from both federal courts
and Texas courts during the Survey period of December 1, 2017 through
November 30, 2018. Subjects discussed in these cases and addressed
herein include: arbitration agreement issues; non-signatories; and court
involvement. Validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, including
delegation of arbitrability questions, continue to be sources of significant
contention, as do the multiple contract affirmative defenses that could
invalidate an arbitration agreement. Different methods by which a non-
signatory can either be compelled to arbitrate or can utilize and benefit
from arbitration are found in cases during this Survey period. What con-
stitutes a final order or award, jurisdictional issues, the vacatur grounds,
and modification of awards were also considered during the Survey
period.
II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ISSUES
During the Survey period, many cases discussed issues of arbitrability.
“Arbitrability” refers to whether or not arbitrators have the authority to
rule on a dispute. The arbitrator’s power is derived from the arbitration
agreement as a matter of contract. Therefore, questions of arbitrability
concern whether or not the agreement gives the arbitrator authority to
rule on a specific question. “A party seeking to compel arbitration must
establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and that the
claims at issue fall within the scope of that agreement.”1 If the party seek-
ing to compel arbitration meets the burden of proof, the burden then
shifts to the party opposing arbitration to prove an affirmative defense to
prevent enforcement of the arbitration provision.2 However, this task of
deciding arbitrability can be delegated to the arbitrator regardless of the
presumption.3
A. DELEGATION
When considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first
determine who decides questions of arbitrability: the courts or the arbi-
trator. Long-standing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence notes that ques-
tions of arbitrability, as potentially dispositive “gateway” questions, are
presumptively for the courts to decide.4 As the Supreme Court put it,
arbitrability questions are “rather arcane,” and cannot be presumed to
have crossed the parties’ minds when negotiating the terms of the binding
agreement without clear and unmistakable intent to send them to arbitra-
1. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018) (citing Venture Cotton
Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014)).
2. See id.
3. See RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Tex. 2018).
4. See Rent-A-Center W. Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010).
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tion.5 Therefore, courts should presume that the question of arbitrability
remains with the court.6 This presumption can be overcome with clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to have the arbitrator
determine questions of arbitrability, even when the trial court would ordi-
narily be the proper forum to hear such validity issues.7
If the party seeking to compel arbitration argues that there is a clause
delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator, the court must deter-
mine “whether the purported delegation clause is in fact a delegation
clause.”8 If the agreement to arbitrate includes a proper delegation clause
and the opponent does not directly challenge the delegation clause itself,
the court will compel arbitration; any questions about the validity of the
agreement as a whole will be addressed by the arbitrator.9
In Ridge Natural Resources, L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P.,10
the question of delegation was heavily discussed. The El Paso Court of
Appeals had to determine if the delegation clause in the arbitration
agreement was sufficient to require the court to compel all questions of
arbitrability to an arbitrator. The court of appeals used a three-question
inquiry to determine delegation:
(1) Did a contract form?
(2) Do the arbitration covenants in a validly formed contract delegate
contract validity issues to the arbitrator?
(3) If the arbitration clause delegates contract validity questions to the
arbitrator, is the party resisting arbitration levelling complaints
about the validity of the arbitration clauses specifically, or the va-
lidity of the container contract as a whole?11
The court of appeals easily determined that there was a contract, and the
delegation clause language clearly showed the intent of the drafters to
delegate as many issues to the arbitrator as was permitted by law.12 In
inquiry three, the court of appeals had to determine if the challenges
were to the arbitration agreement itself or to the container agreement at
large. The court of appeals held that the challenges for substantive uncon-
5. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995); see, e.g., AT&T
Techs. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 699 (1986) (The question of arbi-
trability “is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is
to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).
6. This is different than the more common presumption in favor of arbitration when
the scope of an arbitration clause is at issue. When a contract is ambiguous or silent on the
parties’ intent to arbitrate an issue, the default presumptions are to resolve ambiguities and
inconsistencies in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
7. Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P., 564 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
8. Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Kubala v.
Supreme Prod. Servs., Inc., 830 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 2016)).
9. See id. at 744.
10. Ridge Nat. Res., 564 S.W.3d at 118.
11. See id. at 119–20.
12. Id.
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scionability could have been heard by the court because they went to the
existence of the arbitration clause itself, but the claims for procedural
unconscionability were to the container contract, which the court could
not hear.13
This third inquiry above was also heavily discussed in Edwards v.
DoorDash, Inc.14 Here, the appellant contested the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement as a whole, but did not directly challenge the delega-
tion clause.15 Appellant argued that the arbitration clause as a whole was
unconscionable; included an unenforceable class waiver; and was illusory,
lacking proper consideration.16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that it was bound to compel arbitration after determining the
existence of an arbitration clause, the validity of the delegation clause,
and that all questions of arbitrability would be decided by an arbitrator.17
1. Court Determining Arbitrability
As a default presumption, courts decide gateway questions of arbi-
trability, unless the agreement clearly shows the intent of the parties for
the arbitrator to determine arbitrability.18 Therefore, though there were
many challenges to the courts’ ability to determine arbitrability during
the Survey period, the burden of proof required to overcome this pre-
sumption—clear and unmistakable intent to delegate to the arbitrator—
left many gateway issues to be determined by the courts.19
In Hebbronville Lone Star Rentals, L.L.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals Industrial
Services, L.L.C.,20 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the arbitration agreement was limited in scope and did not delegate
reformation arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, leaving such ques-
tions for the court to decide.21 The Texas Supreme Court made a similar
decision as to the scope of a delegation clause in Jody James Farms, JV v.
Altman Group, Inc.22 Here, the insurance policy in dispute only required
arbitration for disagreements between the farm and the insurer, and
“[g]iven the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence that [the land-
owner] agreed to arbitrate arbitrability in disputes with non-signatories,
compelled arbitration cannot precede a judicial determination that an
agreement to arbitrate exists.”23 Therefore, the presumption that gateway
13. Id. at 131–32.
14. 888 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2018).
15. Id. at 743.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 746. Appellant’s main complaint—outside the validity of the arbitration
agreement—was the failure to certify a class prior to compelling arbitration. However,
because there was a valid delegation clause, the availability of class arbitration must be
decided by the arbitrator. Id.
18. See Ridge Nat. Res., 564 S.W.3d at 118.
19. See, e.g., Encore Enters. v. Borderplex Realty Tr., No. 08-17-00134-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 7941, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 28, 2018, no pet.).
20. 898 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2018).
21. Id. at 636.
22. 547 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. 2018).
23. Id. at 633.
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matters of arbitrability will be decided by the court was followed.24
There can be major consequences when the wrong individual decides
gateway questions of arbitrability. On appeal from a motion to confirm
and a cross-motion to vacate the award in Brown Lab Investments, LLC
v. Moesser,25 the First Houston Court of Appeals held that arbitrability
was an issue for the trial court, not the arbitrator.26 The court of appeals
further held that by deciding gateway questions of arbitrability, the arbi-
trator exceeded his authority, the award should have been vacated, and
arbitrability should have been determined by the lower court on indepen-
dent review.27 The parties have now gone through arbitration, district
court proceedings, and appellate court proceeding, and the entire process
will likely have to start all over before a final award can be confirmed.28
As this case demonstrates, the consequences of wrongfully determining
who decides arbitrability can be costly in both time and money.
2. Arbitrator Determining Arbitrability
Parties to an arbitration agreement can draft around the default pre-
sumption discussed above by expressing their clear and unmistakable in-
tent for gateway questions of arbitrability to be decided by an
arbitrator.29 In Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enterprises,30 the Dallas Court
of Appeals held that the express incorporation of the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules, “empower[s] the
arbitrator to determine arbitrability . . . [and] has been held to be clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to allow the arbitrator to
decide such issues.”31
Additionally, in Arnold v. HomeAway, Inc.,32 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the express incorporation of the AAA
Consumer Rules evidenced the parties’ clear and unmistakable intent to
arbitrate issues of arbitrability.33 The court further held that because
there was “no specific challenge” to the delegation provision itself, addi-
tional arguments about the validity of the agreement as a whole were “for
an arbitrator to resolve.”34
24. Id. at 640.
25. No. 01-16-00837-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6156, at *19, *29 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
26. Id. at *29.
27. Id. at *29–30.
28. See id. at *30.
29. Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enters., No. 05-17-00486-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5610, at *1, *20 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
30. Id.
31. Id. at *21 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 355 S.W.3d 791,
802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (internal citations omitted)).
32. 890 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2018).
33. Id. at 553.
34. Id. at 559.
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B. VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT
Arbitration is a creature of contract. As such, the existence of a valid
agreement to arbitrate disputes is necessary for a court to compel arbitra-
tion. During the Survey period, parties often argued that there was no
valid agreement to arbitrate or that an affirmative defense applied
against arbitration. The elements for valid contracts must be present for
the arbitration agreement to be enforceable: (1) offer; (2) acceptance in
strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the minds;
(4) each party’s consent to the terms; and (5) execution and delivery of
the contract with the intent for it to be mutual and binding.35
In a motion to compel arbitration, the court must determine: (1)
“whether the parties entered into any arbitration agreement at all”; and
(2) “whether this claim is covered by the arbitration agreement.”36 Ac-
cording to the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, “if a party op-
posing an [arbitration] application . . . denies the existence of the
agreement [to arbitrate], the court shall summarily determine that is-
sue.”37 Additionally, Section 171.023(b) provides that “if there is a sub-
stantial bona fide dispute as to whether an agreement to arbitrate exists,
the court shall try the issue promptly and summarily.”38
1. Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate
The first step in determining if there is a valid and enforceable agree-
ment to arbitrate is finding that there is in fact some agreement to arbi-
trate. When challenging the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the
parties can challenge either: (1) specific challenge to the validity of the
arbitration agreement or clause itself; or (2) the entire contract.39 A court
determines the first type of challenge, but the second must go to the arbi-
trator.40 Based on these facts, the Dallas Court of Appeals determined in
Law Office of Thomas J. Henry v. Cavanaugh that the arbitration agree-
ment was valid, but that the arbitrator will decide the enforceability of
the contract as a whole.41 During the Survey period, many cases discussed
the issues that can arise when determining the existence of an arbitration
agreement: (1) contract language interpretation; (2) lack of required for-
malities; (3) clickwrap agreements; and (4) multiple papers being jointly
interpreted to form one agreement.
35. Kya¨ni, Inc., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5610, at *5–6.
36. Richland Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., 745 F. App’x 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2018) (quot-
ing Kubala v. Supreme Prod. Servs., Inc., 830 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2016)).
37. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021(b).
38. Id. § 171.023.
39. Law Office of Thomas J. Henry v. Cavanaugh, No. 05-17-00849-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3182, at *1, *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 647–48 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding)).
40. Id.
41. See id. at *5.
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There will always be arguments about the validity of the agreement
based on the language of the agreement itself. During the Survey period,
this was no different. In South Green Builders, LP v. Cleveland, appellee
contended that the language in the arbitration agreement was permissive,
but not mandatory.42 South Green Builders requested arbitration for a
contract dispute, but Cleveland refused, arguing that the language of the
agreement did not require arbitration simply because one party requested
it. The agreement stated that “the parties may submit disputes to arbitra-
tion,” and prior drafts of the agreement proved that the word “shall” had
been replaced with “may.”43 However, the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals, following precedent, held that the plain meaning of the lan-
guage in the agreement requires mandatory arbitration if a party requests
it, and that the evidence of prior drafts cannot be admitted to change the
unambiguous meaning of the contract due to the parol evidence rule.44
One common requirement for valid agreements is the signatures of
both parties. In Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, L.P., the district court’s judgment
compelling arbitration was reversed because there was “not a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate.”45 The agreement included language requiring the par-
ties to sign the agreement in order for it to be effective; however, the
employer never signed the agreement. The contractual nature of arbitra-
tion mandates that the arbitration agreement be valid according to its
words. Here, the contract required a signature to be valid, and the con-
tract was never signed.46
However, in Law Office of Thomas J. Henry v. Cavanaugh, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held the arbitration agreement valid even though ap-
pellant law firm failed to sign the fee contract.47 Appellant’s conduct
showed a meeting of the minds, and any noncompliance with Texas laws
requiring contingent fee agreements to be signed by both the client and
the attorney48 did not make the arbitration agreement itself unenforce-
able against the client who signed the fee contract.49
The rise of technology and online agreements has also led to new issues
in arbitration. An interesting question regarding whether clicking an “I
Understand” or “I Agree” button creates a valid agreement to arbitrate
was posed in multiple cases. In Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enterprises, the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that a valid arbitration agreement existed
between two commercial parties when the appellee contractor completed
42. S. Green Builders, LP v. Cleveland, 558 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
43. Id. at 257.
44. Id. at 258–59.
45. Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, L.P., 892 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2018).
46. Id. at 689–90.
47. Law Office of Thomas J. Henry v. Cavanaugh, No. 05-17-00849-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3182, at *1, *17 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
48. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.065(a).
49. Cavanaugh, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3182, at *5.
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the online application that included a binding arbitration agreement.50
In another click-to-arbitrate case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Constantine,
the Dallas Court of Appeals had to determine if an unsophisticated indi-
vidual party could be bound similarly by an online “clickwrap” agree-
ment.51 Employee of appellant, who was killed on the job, completed an
online employee injury benefits plan learning module which included an
agreement to arbitrate negligence and wrongful death claims against ap-
pellant employer.52 Appellees argued that the employee did not sign the
arbitration agreement and there was “no evidence [the employee] actu-
ally agreed to arbitrate any claim in this case, or that he even had notice
of the alleged agreement.”53 However, the employer testified that: (1) a
confidential employee identification number and password was required
to access the module; (2) the employee had to separately and deliberately
access the arbitration agreement; (3) the screen instructed the employee
to “read the policy carefully”; (4) the employee had to click a box stating
“I Understand” underneath the “Arbitration Acknowledgement”; and fi-
nally, (5) the program notified the employee that he had completed the
course and acknowledged the arbitration agreement.54 The court of ap-
peals held that the employer met the burden of proving that there was a
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties.55
Further issues regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement can
arise when the parties to a dispute have multiple, conflicting agreements
regarding dispute resolution. This was the issue in Adcock v. Five Star
Rentals/Sales, Inc.56 Here, the original employment contract between the
parties included a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. A later
pre-suit agreement required that the issue at hand would be determined
in the courts as opposed to arbitration. The later agreement did not ex-
pressly discharge the original arbitration agreement; therefore, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals had to determine which dispute resolution
agreement would prevail.57 The court of appeals held that because the
contracts governed the same subject matter and, thus, could not be inter-
preted together, the latter contract must prevail.58
Multiple papers can also cause confusion when some contain arbitra-
tion agreements and others do not. This was the precise issue in Richland
Equipment Co. v. Deere & Co., where the particular agreements at issue
50. Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enters., No. 05-17-00486-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5610, at *1, *19 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
51. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Constantine, No. 05-17-00694-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
3023, *26–27 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id. at *13.
54. Id. at *13–14.
55. Id. at *21.
56. No. 04-17-00531-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2690, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Apr. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
57. Id. at *1–3.
58. Id. at *7.
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did not contain arbitration agreements.59 However, the two agreements
were so closely connected to a third agreement, which contained an arbi-
tration clause but had been dropped from the lawsuit.60 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held “that the delegation of arbitrability
was intended to apply to all disputes.”61
2. Scope of the Agreement
“If there is prima facie evidence that a contract formed, the scope of
the arbitration clause’s sweep will determine which issues are arbitrable
and which are not.”62 “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”63 After determining that
a valid arbitration agreement exists, the analysis turns to whether the al-
leged dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.64 Most arbitration
agreements are written very broadly to cover “all disputes” or “all
claims” relating to either the contract itself or possibly even to the rela-
tionship formed by the contract. These broad agreements often withstand
judicial review for scope and arbitrability. Many cases during the Survey
period mentioned arguments about the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment; however, most quickly dispelled the issue.65
In Sinclair Group, Ltd. v. Haggblom, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration,
holding that the broad language of the arbitration agreement encom-
passed the issue at hand.66 Likewise, in Dallas Food & Beverage, LLC v.
Lantrip, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the arbitration agreement
“unambiguously” required binding arbitration on any claim arising out of
the dancer’s work at the club “whether contractual, in tort, or based upon
common law or statute.”67
In Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, petitioners argued that their claims were not
within the scope of the arbitration agreement which provided that “all
disputes . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration.”68 Petitioners ar-
gued that their claims related solely to respondent’s use of the criminal
justice system, not claims arising under the contract. The Texas Supreme
59. Richland Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., 745 F. App’x 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2018).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 525.
62. Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P., 564 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Aug. 24, 2018, no pet.); see also Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738,
743 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).
63. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018) (citing In re Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002)).
64. See Ridge Nat. Res., 564 S.W.3d at 117.
65. See, e.g., Sinclair Grp., Ltd. v. Haggblom, 548 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. App.—Beau-
mont 2018, no pet.); Dall. Food & Bev., LLC v. Lantrip, No. 05-17-00647-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1464, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
66. Sinclair Grp., 548 S.W.3d at 46.
67. Dall. Food & Bev., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1464, at *5–6.
68. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 113–14.
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Court noted, however, that “the scope of an arbitration clause that in-
cludes all ‘disputes,’ and not just claims, is very broad and encompasses
more than claims based solely on rights originating exclusively from the
contract.”69 Though petitioners’ claims were not for breach of contract,
their claims were based on the manner in which respondent behaved pur-
suant to the contracts and were within the broad scope of the arbitration
agreement.70
However, during the Survey period, there were cases finding that the
claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. In Staley v.
Crossley, the arbitration agreement limited arbitration to “discrepancies
based on an audit” which had not yet occurred.71 Additionally, the agree-
ment did not use broad sweeping language such as “arising out of” or
“relating to.”72 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the right to compel
arbitration had not yet accrued under the arbitration clause.73 Addition-
ally, in In Interest of M.W.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals used tradi-
tional contract interpretation principles to determine if the dispute over a
party’s failure to pay amounts already determined under a divorce decree
fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement in a divorce settle-
ment.74 The court of appeals held that the dispute was not within the
scope of the arbitration agreement because a dispute regarding payments
already determined under the divorce agreement was not a “dispute”
under the arbitration clause and to treat it as such would render meaning-
less the processes already taken to come to a divorce agreement.75
3. Affirmative Defenses
If the party seeking to compel arbitration proves that a valid agreement
to arbitrate exists, the party opposing arbitration can raise an affirmative
defense. The most common defenses raised were illusory promises, un-
conscionability, and waiver.76
a. Illusory Promises
An illusory promise is one that bestows upon one party the unilateral
or retrospective right to terminate the agreement at any time. More sim-
69. Id. at 115 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 116.
71. Staley v. Crossley, No. 05-17-00319-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3540, at *12 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
72. Id. at *14.
73. Id. at *15–16.
74. In Interest of M.W.M., No. 05-17-01309-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5401, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
75. Id. at *7–8.
76. The defense of misnomer was also discussed in Redi-Mix, LLC v. Martinez, No.
05-17-01347-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5683, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op.). In this case, the arbitration agreement was between the employee and
Redi-Mix, L.P., a company that was no longer in existence and had been replaced by Redi-
Mix, LLC. Appellants argued that the contract contained a simple misnomer, but the Dal-
las Court of Appeals held that they did not meet their burden on appeal to overturn the
denied motion to compel arbitration. Id. at *20.
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ply put, an illusory arbitration agreement “binds one party to arbitrate,
while allowing the other to choose whether to arbitrate.”77 In ReadyOne
Industries, Inc. v. Lopez, the parties had a mutual agreement to arbitrate;
however, appellee employee claimed that the arbitration agreement was
illusory.78 However, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that because the
unambiguous terms of the agreement required ten days’ notice before
termination of the agreement to arbitrate, the agreement could not be
illusory.79
In CBRE, Inc. v. Turner, the terminated employee argued that the ar-
bitration agreement was illusory because the agreement did not require
the employer to give advance notice of any plan to terminate the employ-
ment agreement containing the arbitration agreement, including termina-
tion of the agreement upon termination of employment.80 The employee
argued that the employer held “employees to the promise to arbitrate
while reserving its own escape hatch.”81 However, the agreement did not
include language giving the employer the ability to unilaterally modify
the agreement and, importantly, the agreement unambiguously noted
that it continued to govern claims arising from termination of employ-
ment.82 Therefore, even though the employer had the right to terminate
the employment agreement at any time and without notice, the arbitra-
tion agreement continued to be effective after the employment agree-
ment’s termination and was not illusory.83
In Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Dreese, the Corpus Christi-
Edinburg Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion
when it held that the agreement was illusory.84 The challenge was to the
entire contract and not a specific challenge to the validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement itself; therefore, the question of illusory contract was for
the arbitrator to decide.85
77. CBRE, Inc. v. Turner, No. 05-18-00404-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8591, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, &
Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. 2015)).
78. ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 551 S.W.3d 305, 312 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018,
pet. denied).
79. Id. at 312–14.
80. Turner, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8591, at *7.
81. Id. at *8.
82. Id. at *8–10.
83. See id. at *10.
84. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Dreese, No. 13-17-00102-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1736, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
85. As the court stated:
There are two types of challenges to an arbitration provision: (1) a specific
challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement or clause, and (2) a
broader challenge to the entire contract, either on a ground that directly af-
fects the entire agreement, or on the ground that one of the contract’s provi-
sion is illegal and renders the whole contract invalid.
Id. at *6.
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b. Unconscionability
During the Survey period, many cases considered both procedural and
substantive unconscionability. Texas law renders unconscionable con-
tracts—including those to arbitrate—unenforceable under the policy that
unfair bargains should not be enforced.86 “Procedural unconscionability
refers to the circumstances surrounding” the drafting and adoption
processes for the arbitration agreement, and “substantive unconscionabil-
ity [considers] the unfairness” of the actual words of the arbitration
agreement.87 Many cases argue unconscionability; however, the burden
of proof is really high because this doctrine invalidates an otherwise en-
forceable contract.88 “The basic test for unconscionability is whether,
given the parties’ general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clause involved is so one-sided
that it is unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the par-
ties made the contract.”89
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Constantine, as previously discussed in Sec-
tion II.A.1 above, the employee had to click a button acknowledging his
agreement to be bound by an arbitration agreement. The employee’s ben-
eficiaries argued that the agreement was unconscionable because it was
hidden in an online program about the health benefit plan, but actually
required arbitration on all employment claims. They further argued that
the agreement was unconscionable because of the disparity in bargaining
power between the sophisticated employer and the unsophisticated em-
ployee. However, Texas courts have long held that “gross disparity in bar-
gaining power between employer and employee, without more, does not
establish procedural unconscionability.”90 Because the employee failed to
provide sufficient evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation or trickery,
any disparity in bargaining power or misleading circumstances is insuffi-
cient to establish procedural unconscionability.91
In ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Lopez, the employee argued that the
arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she had
a limited ability to read and write, suffered from multiple learning disor-
ders, and the employer had misrepresented the nature and importance of
the papers that were being signed by the human resources representative
who told the employee “that the documents are for benefits if you get
86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Constantine, No. 05-17-00694-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
3023, at *24 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ridge Nat.
Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P., 564 S.W.3d 105, 135 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018,
no pet.).
87. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3023, at *24; see also ReadyOne Indus. v.
Lopez, 551 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied); Ridge Nat. Res., 564
S.W.3d at 135.
88. Ridge Nat. Res., 564 S.W.3d at 135.
89. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3023, at *24–25 (internal quotations omit-
ted) (citing In re First Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001) (orig.
proceeding)).
90. Id. at *26 (citing In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tex. 2002)).
91. Id. at *28.
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hurt on the job, just sign them.”92 The employee had, however, been pro-
vided with a copy of the agreement in her native language, Spanish, and
there was no evidence of affirmative misrepresentation, a coercive envi-
ronment, or trickery by the employer.93 Therefore, the El Paso Court of
Appeals held that the agreement was not unconscionable.94
In UniFirst Linen, a Division of UniFirst Holdings, L.P. v. Poncho’s
Restaurants, Inc., the appellant argued both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.95 Appellant argued first that the print was so small as
to be unconscionable; the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals
noted that the print was so small it was barely legible in the photocopied
version of the agreement in the record.96 Appellant additionally argued
that he had no viable alternative to signing the agreement, and that the
sophistication and knowledge differences between the parties caused the
agreement to be unconscionable. The court of appeals held that even if
appellant was in a less advantageous bargaining position, it did not meet
its burden to show the arbitration clause at issue was procedurally uncon-
scionable because the clause was in the same small print as the contract’s
other technical terms and appellant’s manager testified that he discussed
the arbitration clause with appellant when the agreement was executed.97
Appellant in UniFirst Linen also argued that the agreement was sub-
stantively unconscionable because it evoked the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), which does not consider the same policy goals as the Texas Arbi-
tration Act (TAA), and the clause places unfair burdens on the company
regarding the default location for arbitration proceedings.98 However, the
court of appeals held that the arbitration clause was not substantively
unconscionable because all provisions—including choice-of-law—applied
to both parties and thus did not indicate that the agreement was imper-
missibly one-sided.99 Substantive unconscionability was also argued in
Dominguez v. Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C.100 Appellant argued that the ar-
bitration clause was unconscionable because it required a two-year notice
of complaints as a condition precedent to seeking arbitration. Appellant,
however, failed to explain how this notice provision was so oppressive
and unfairly surprising as to render the arbitration clause unconscionable.
Therefore, the court of appeals held that the agreement was valid and
enforceable.101
92. ReadyOne Indus., 551 S.W.3d at 315.
93. Id. at 315–16.
94. Id. at 316.
95. UniFirst Linen, a Div. of UniFirst Holdings, L.P. v. Poncho’s Rests., Inc., No. 13-
17-00603-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5036, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg
July 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
96. Id. at *9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *12–13.
99. Id. at *14.
100. No. 01-17-00332-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4667, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] June 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
101. Id. at *9.
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Many parties will argue unconscionability, but the argument rarely
prevails.102 However, in Ridge Natural Resources, L.L.C. v. Double Eagle
Royalty, L.P., the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable on its merits based on the contract’s pro-
hibition of exemplary damages, which cuts off statutory rights available in
a judicial forum.103 Texas has a strong policy goal of preventing fraud,
malice, and gross negligence of which the ability to impose exemplary
damages is a strong component.104 Therefore, the court of appeals held
that the prohibition was substantively unconscionable as a matter of pub-
lic policy.105
After determining that a provision of the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable, the court of appeals discussed the possibility of severing
the offending section while retaining the rest of the agreement.106
“[I]llegal or unconscionable provision[s] of a contract may generally be
severed so long as [they] do[ ] not constitute the essential purpose of the
agreement.”107 Though the agreement did not contain a severability
clause—which often evidences the parties’ intent for a contract to survive
if an individual clause is invalidated—the court of appeals held that the
unconscionable provision could be severed from the remainder of the ar-
bitration agreement.108
c. Waiver
One common affirmative defense argued during the Survey period was
implied waiver by invoking judicial process. “There is a strong presump-
tion against waiver of arbitration, but it is not irrebuttable. The party op-
posing arbitration based on the affirmative defense of waiver has the
burden to prove waiver.”109 The party arguing waiver must prove: (1)
that the party seeking arbitration “substantially invoked the judicial pro-
cess in a manner inconsistent with its claimed right to compel arbitra-
tion”; and (2) that the opposing party “suffered actual prejudice as a
result.”110
102. See, e.g., id.; UniFirst Linen, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5036, at *12, *14; ReadyOne
Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 551 S.W.3d 305, 316 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied).
103. Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, 564 S.W.3d 105, 138 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
104. Id. at 137.
105. Id. at 138.
106. Id. at 139.
107. Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. 2014).
108. Ridge Nat. Res., 564 S.W.3d at 139. The court of appeals held that the arbitration
agreement was enforceable, except for the clause as to exemplary damages that was sev-
ered. Id.
109. BBX Operating, LLC v. Am. Fluorite, Inc., No. 09-17-00245-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 923, at *1, *15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal
citations omitted).
110. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 116 (Tex. 2018).
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i. Substantially Invoking the Judicial Process
To waive the right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial
process, “the party seeking arbitration must take specific and deliberate
actions inconsistent with the right to arbitrate after the filing of the suit or
actively try, but fail, to achieve a satisfactory result through litigation
before turning to arbitration.”111 Actions waiving the right to arbitration
must go beyond filing suit, delay in seeking arbitration, or seeking initial
discovery; the parties conduct must unequivocally and substantially in-
voke judicial process.112 The court may look at the totality of the circum-
stances and can consider, among other things, “how much discovery has
been conducted, who initiated it, and whether it relates to the merits; how
much time and expense has been incurred in litigation; and the proximity
in time between a trial setting and the filing of the motion seeking
arbitration.”113
In BBX Operating, LLC v. American Fluorite, Inc., the Beaumont
Court of Appeals held that appellant did not substantially invoke the ju-
dicial process by responding to discovery or delaying the motion to com-
pel arbitration.114 However, the court of appeals held that appellant did
substantially invoke the judicial process by seeking enforcement of the
“Rule 11 Settlement Agreement” that addressed the same claims as arbi-
tration at issue.115 The court of appeals also held that appellees would be
prejudiced if arbitration was compelled because it would result in a piece-
meal result and they would incur excessive costs and fees required to pro-
ceed both in litigation and in arbitration.116
The burden of proving waiver is very high and is placed on the party
opposing arbitration. Many cases during the Survey period held that the
opposing party failed to meet the burden of proof that the party moving
for arbitration substantially invoked the judicial process. In Henry v.
Cash Biz, LP, appellants argued that the appellees had invoked the crimi-
nal justice system, thereby waiving their right to compel arbitration, when
they provided evidence to criminal prosecutors that led to criminal
charges on the civil debts at issue in the case.117 The Texas Supreme
Court held that appellees did not substantively invoke the justice system
as they simply provided information to the district attorney and then
“let[ ] the chips fall where they may.”118
Additionally, in In re Deeb, appellant argued that the arbitration
should be compelled because appellant did not substantially invoke the
111. Camp v. Potts, No. 05-18-00149-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7959, at *1, *6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
112. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 116; see also BBX Operating, LLC, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
923, at *20 (citing G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P., 458 S.W.3d 502, 515
(Tex. 2015)).
113. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 117.
114. BBX Operating, LLC, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 923, at *20.
115. Id. at *21–22.
116. Id. at *22–23.
117. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 117–18.
118. Id. at 118.
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judicial process.119 The Austin Court of Appeals agreed and held that
appellant did not impliedly waive his right to arbitration by filing an an-
swer, a motion to compel, and a second arbitration; the four and a half
month delay caused by ignoring applicable AAA fees did not prejudice
appellee.120 Finally, in Diligent Texas Dedicated LLC v. York, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the claimant did not substantially in-
voke the judicial process.121 The employer certainly came very close to
substantially invoking the judicial process when he filed a merits-based
motion for summary judgment, however, “because [the employee] did
not show prejudice from [the employer’s] delay in invoking arbitration,
the trial court abused its discretion by not compelling arbitration.”122
ii. Prejudice
Prejudice “refers to an inherent unfairness caused by a party’s attempt
to have it both ways by switching between litigation and arbitration to its
own advantage.”123 “Prejudice may therefore result when the movant
first seeks to use the judicial process to gain access to information that is
not discoverable in arbitration, and/or when the nonmovant incurs costs
and fees due to the movant’s actions or delay.”124 “A party should not be
allowed purposefully and unjustifiably to manipulate the exercise of its
arbitral rights simply to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the oppos-
ing party.”125
In Forby v. One Technologies, L.P., it was obvious that appellee sub-
stantially invoked the judicial process by pursuing a decision on the mer-
its in the court before seeking arbitration.126 However, the district court
held that there was no prejudice to the opposing party; therefore, appel-
lee did not waive the right to arbitration.127 On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, holding
that appellant was prejudiced and noting that “[w]hen a party will have to
re-litigate in the arbitration forum an issue already decided by the district
court in its favor, that party is prejudiced.”128 The Fifth Circuit held that
“[a] party does not get to learn that the district court is not receptive to its
119. In re Deeb, No. 03-17-00635-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11703, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Dec. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (orig. proceeding).
120. Id. at *4–5.
121. Diligent Tex. Dedicated LLC v. York, No. 02-17-00416-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
7146 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 30, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
122. Id. at *14 (the employee only showed evidence of lost time and attorney fees).
123. College Station Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burgess, No. 10-15-00191-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4064, at *1, *31 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing G.T.
Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P., 458 S.W.3d 502, 515 (Tex. 2015)) (internal
quotations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Camp v. Potts, No. 05-18-00149-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7959, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d
580, 597 (Tex. 2008)).
126. Forby v. One Techs., 909 F.3d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 2018).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 785.
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arguments and then be allowed a second bite at the apple through
arbitration.”129
Many cases during the Survey period focused their prejudice argu-
ments on delay. In Camp v. Potts, appellant waited almost a year after
moving to compel arbitration to set a hearing date and also failed to con-
solidate cases for judicial efficiency.130 Appellee argued that the delay
tactics caused significant “inconvenience, expense, and heartache.”131 In
ruling for appellant, the Dallas Court of Appeals stuck with its own pre-
cedent that says delay is often not enough to establish waiver.132
Similarly, in College Station Medical Center, LLC v. Burgess, the plain-
tiff asserted claims regarding health care payments after a car accident.133
One and a half years later, plaintiff amended the petition and added a
breach of contract claim. Five months later, defendant moved to compel
arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the delay in moving to compel arbitra-
tion was prejudicial because she had incurred significant attorney’s fees
during the delay, defendant received more discovery than would likely
have been available in arbitration, and much of the work necessary for
arbitration would be time consuming and duplicative of the litigation.134
The Waco Court of Appeals held that the defendant did not substantially
invoke the judicial process as to the breach of contract claim because
plaintiff caused much of the delay, discovery issues, and duplication is-
sues by waiting a year and a half to allege the contract claim.135 Finally,
the court of appeals held that even if there was proof that the defendant
substantially invoked the judicial process, plaintiff failed to meet the bur-
den of proof to establish prejudice.136
III. NON-SIGNATORIES
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to
arbitrate a dispute to which they did not agree to arbitrate. However,
“non-signatories to a contract containing an arbitration clause may be al-
lowed or required to arbitrate if rules of law or equity would apply the
contract to them generally.”137 The issue of non-signatories is an issue of
arbitrability, presumably for the court to decide; however, as discussed
above in Section II.A., these gateway issues can be delegated to the arbi-
129. Id. (citing Petroleum Pipe Ams. Corp. v. Jindal Saw Ltd., 575 F.3d 476, 482 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
130. Camp, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7959, at *9.
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id. at *11 (citing In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006)).
133. College Station Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burgess, No. 10-15-00191-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4064, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
134. Id. at *36–37.
135. Id. at *37.
136. Id. at *36.
137. Shillinglaw v. Baylor Univ., No. 05-17-00498-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4611, at
*1, *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Roe v. Ladymon,
318 S.W.3d 502, 511 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)).
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trator upon clear and unmistakable intent of the parties to so delegate.138
Texas and federal law recognize six theories “that may bind non-signa-
tories to arbitration agreements: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) as-
sumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel[;] and (6) third-
party beneficiary.”139 During the Survey period, in addition to these six
theories, parties tried different methods to hold non-signatory third-par-
ties to arbitration agreements. In both Dauz v. Valdez140 and Shillinglaw
v. Baylor University,141 parties unsuccessfully argued respondeat superior,
and in D.R. Horton-Emerald, Ltd. v. Mitchell, appellant unsuccessfully
argued that appellee was a successor in interest to not only the benefits of
a contract, but also to the obligations and restrictions of the contract.142
A. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
During the Survey period, incorporation by reference was rarely dis-
cussed in detail. Texas law “allows parties to incorporate by reference
other writings into a contract, and upon doing so, the terms of those other
writings become enforceable obligations.”143 In Encore Enterprises v.
Borderplex Realty Trust, appellants argued that a draft operating agree-
ment was incorporated by reference into the contract at issue, which vali-
dated the arbitration agreement in the draft.144 The El Paso Court of
Appeals did not agree and held that incorporation of the draft would
unnecessarily contort the structure of agreement at issue, rendering cer-
tain provisions meaningless and subverting the parties’ intended contrac-
tual scheme.145
B. ASSUMPTION
Implied assumption also appeared in the cases during the Survey pe-
riod. “An implied assumption of obligations may arise when the benefit
received by the assignee is so entwined with the burden imposed by the
assignor’s contract that the assignee is estopped from denying assumption
and the assignee would otherwise be unjustly enriched.”146 However, be-
138. Brown Lab Invs., LLC v. Moesser, No. 01-16-00837-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
6156, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
139. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding).
140. No. 01-15-00831-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7163, at *1, *6 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.).
141. Shillinglaw, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4611, at *6.
142. D.R. Horton-Emerald, Ltd. v. Mitchell, No. 01-17-00426-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 731, at *1, *8–12. (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
143. Encore Enters. v. Borderplex Realty Tr., No. 08-17-00134-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7941, at *1, *16 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 28, 2018, no pet.) (interpreting Dela-
ware law).
144. Id.
145. See id. at *25.
146. D.R. Horton-Emerald, Ltd., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 731, at *12 (quoting NextEra
Retail of Tex., LP v. Inv’rs Warranty of Am., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2013, pet denied)) (internal quotations omitted).
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cause implied covenants are not favored in the law, courts do “not lightly
imply additional covenants enlarging the terms of a contract.”147
In D.R. Horton-Emerald, Ltd. v. Mitchell, appellant homebuilder ar-
gued that the appellee, who purchased an appellant-built home from the
original owner, impliedly assumed the contract between the builder and
the original owners by “demanding warranty inspection and compliance
pursuant to the [contract].”148 However, the First Houston Court of Ap-
peals held that the evidence did not show that the appellees were seeking
a benefit under the contract or that the benefits they did seek were “en-
twined with the burden imposed by” the contract.149 The court of appeals
reasoned that the limited warranty utilized by appellees was a “separate
and independent document” from the contract.150
C. AGENCY
The agency doctrine is most often used to allow non-signatories to
compel arbitration with a party to the agreement. However, in Shillin-
glaw v. Baylor University, appellant, the ex-Director for Football Opera-
tions, attempted to reverse this ordinary usage and compel unwilling non-
signatories to arbitration.151
Appellant was terminated from his employment and asserted claims for
libel, slander, tortious interference with contract, conspiracy, and other
claims. Following his termination, appellant asserted claims against Bay-
lor University, the interim president of the University, and five individual
members of the Board of Regents.152 Appellant argued that the non-sig-
natory appellees were bound in their capacities as employees or agents of
Baylor as Baylor’s interim president and its senior vice president/chief
financial officer had a “close connection to Baylor,” meaning that the
claims are so intertwined that arbitration is appropriate.153 Appellant
opined that the “members of the Baylor Board of Regents have an even
closer relationship than that of employer and employee, that they are the
human agents through which the university acts.”154 The Dallas Court of
Appeals was reluctant to follow this line of reasoning and held that there
was not sufficient evidence to require the unwilling non-signatories to ar-
bitrate.155 The court of appeals further stated that “to require an unwill-
ing non-signatory to arbitrate is no small matter of procedural
convenience. It would carry serious constitutional implications and un-
dermine the core consensual nature of the federal arbitration act.”156
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *13.
150. See id. at *14.
151. Shillinglaw v. Baylor Univ., No. 05-17-00498-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4611, at
*7–8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id. at *5.
154. Id. at *5–6.
155. See id. at *9.
156. Id. at *8.
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D. ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of estoppel “simply precludes a signatory from avoiding
arbitration with a [non-signatory] when the issues the non-signatory is
seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that
the estopped party has signed.”157
1. Direct Benefits Estoppel
“[E]stoppel principles may require a non-signatory to arbitrate if it
seeks through its claim to obtain a direct benefit from the contract con-
taining the arbitration clause.”158 The direct benefits estoppel theory
“precludes a signatory claimant from having it ‘both ways’ by seeking to
hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agree-
ment, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand,
denying arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signa-
tory.”159 In other words, a signatory cannot “both have his contract and
defeat it too.”160
The simplest usage of direct benefits estoppel is to estop a party from
objecting to being bound to arbitration under an agreement that they are
seeking to directly benefit from. However, direct benefits estoppel can
also be used to make parties “arbitrate claims if liability arises from a
contract with an arbitration clause, but not if liability arises from general
obligations imposed by law.”161 In Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enterprises,
the Dallas Court of Appeals had to determine if the non-signatory appel-
lant’s claims against the party to a distributor agreement for tortious in-
terference could be compelled to arbitrate under the direct benefits
theory.162 The court of appeals held that appellant’s claims not only refer-
enced the existence of the distributor agreement, which included an arbi-
tration clause, but relied on the existence of the agreement for the
validity of their claims.163 Therefore, appellant was entitled to invoke the
arbitration clause of the agreement, and appellees were estopped from
refusing to arbitrate the claims.164
As noted above, for direct benefits estoppel to apply, the non-signing
party must be seeking to benefit from or enforce the terms of an agree-
ment; however, “[w]hen the substance of the claim arises from general
obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other com-
mon law duties or federal law, rather than from the contract, ‘direct bene-
fits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the
157. Id.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Kya¨ni, Inc. v. HD Walz II Enters., No. 05-17-00486-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
5610, at *1, *22 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing VSR Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. McLendon, 409 S.W.3d 817, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)).
160. Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 637 (Tex. 2018).
161. Kya¨ni, Inc., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5610, at *22–23.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *25.
164. Id.
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contract.”165 In Cardon Healthcare Network, Inc. v. Goldberg, the Austin
Court of Appeals followed this distinction, holding that the claims were
all statutory or common law causes of action and direct benefits estoppel
did not apply.166
There are often multiple contracts governing different aspects of a
commercial relationship. In Voss Engineering, Inc. v. Bauer, it was this
situation that led to a dispute regarding if there was a valid arbitration
agreement requiring the dispute to go to arbitration.167 In appellees’ suit
for breach of contract, negligence, malpractice, and deceptive trade prac-
tices, appellants could not compel arbitration under the general contract
because appellees’ claims were based on subcontracts and statutory and
common law. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied appellants’ motion to compel arbitration.168
A unique case examined the applicability of the direct benefits estop-
pel theory to an arbitration clause in a will. In Ali v. Smith, appellant, a
former executor who was being sued by the current executor for failing to
comply with the will, sought to compel arbitration based on the arbitra-
tion clause in the will.169 Appellant argued that the doctrine of direct
benefits estoppel was applicable because the appellee (current executor)
had enforced the will by bringing the current claims and had benefitted
from the will by “receiv[ing] appointee fees.”170 The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals held that direct benefits estoppel did not apply because
the claims were based on statutory and common law and that appellee
was entitled to the fees under Texas law.171
However, as noted many times, arbitration is a creature of contract.
This runs true for non-parties seeking to compel arbitration under a con-
tract. The contract can draft around these rules by explicitly stating in the
contract that the contractual rights and remedies cannot be extended to
anyone other than the parties and their permitted successors and assign-
ees. This was the case in Black v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc.172 The
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the expressed terms of
the contract limited who could utilize the forum selection clause in the
contract at issue.173
165. Cardon Healthcare Network, Inc. v. Goldberg, No. 03-17-00474-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1639, at *1, *10–11 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at *15.
167. Voss Eng’g, Inc. v. Bauer, No. 13-16-00247-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4529, at *1,
*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
168. Id. at *8–9.
169. Ali v. Smith, 554 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
170. Id. at 759.
171. Id. at 761.
172. 551 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
173. Id. at 356.
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2. Equitable Estoppel
In Barantas, Inc. v. Enterprise Financial Group, the Dallas Court of
Appeals allowed a signatory to an agreement to compel non-signatories
to arbitrate “because the supplier’s claims against the non-signatories
were so intertwined with and dependent upon the 2008 Agreement that it
would be impractical to resolve the supplier’s claims against the sales
company’s without simultaneously resolving the claims against the non-
signatories.”174
E. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Arbitration agreements can be enforced by third-party beneficiaries,
“so long as the parties to the contract intended to secure a benefit to that
third party and entered into the contract directly for the third party’s ben-
efit.”175 As a matter of interpretation, a mere description of the contract’s
intended use cannot—on its own—confer third-party-beneficiary status;
the intent must be clearly spelled out in the contract.176
In Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Group, Inc., appellant farm argued
that they were not a third-party beneficiary to an insurance policy.177 The
Texas Supreme Court held that any general benefit conferred was “indi-
rect and incidental” at best and did not create a third-party beneficiary
relationship that would compel appellant to arbitration.178 The supreme
court noted that absent an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, it
would not compel arbitration under the agreement.179
In Cardon Healthcare Network, Inc. v. Goldberg, appellee alleged in an
amended petition that she was an intended third-party beneficiary of an
agreement between a healthcare network and a health insurance pro-
vider.180 After appellant moved to compel arbitration based on third-
party beneficiary theory, appellee dropped that claim. However, appel-
lant continued to argue to compel arbitration because appellee continued
to seek benefits from the agreement by referring to terms in the petition.
The Austin Court of Appeals held that no third-party beneficiary status
existed because there was no evidence that either party to the contract
intended to confer upon appellee a benefit by the agreement.181
174. Barantas, Inc. v. Enter. Fin. Grp., No. 05-17-00896-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
6169, at *1, *26 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
175. Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. 2018) (quot-
ing In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 630.
178. Id. at 636.
179. Id. at 637.
180. Cardon Healthcare Network, Inc. v. Goldberg, No. 03-17-00474-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1639, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).




Cases from this Survey period continued to hold that appellate courts
lack jurisdiction when the trial court does not issue a final order on the
applicable motion—most commonly in motions to compel arbitration.182
As such, interlocutory appeals are prohibited, as the appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to decide the matter. “A final decision is one that ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but
execute the judgment.”183 When the order on appeal sends the parties to
arbitration, the order becomes “final” once the district court has dis-
missed all the claims before it. However, if the court stays the proceed-
ings pending arbitration, this is not a final order and is therefore un-
appealable.184 Appellant stated that he would wait for the dispute to be
dismissed so that he could appeal the final order.
In Griggs v. S.G.E. Management, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit expanded on the concept of voluntary dismissals and
whether they are final orders capable of being appealed.185 Here, appel-
lant was ordered multiple times to submit the claim to arbitration. How-
ever, appellant refused, stating that he disagreed with the order
compelling arbitration and was ready to litigate the dispute or wait and
appeal the decision after the case was dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion.186 Appellees contended that this was a voluntary dismissal that
could not be appealed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a). The
Fifth Circuit did not agree and held that appellant’s statements were not a
voluntary dismissal but merely a statement of his intended inaction; thus,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.187
The issuance of a partial award will tend to complicate arbitration pro-
ceedings, including the court proceeding to confirm the award. In Signa-
ture Pharmaceuticals, L.L.C. v. Ranbaxy, Inc., the arbitration panel issued
182. Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act further states that an appeal may be
taken from an order
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, (B) denying a
petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed, (C) deny-
ing an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration, (D)
confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or (E)
modifying, correcting, or vacating an award.
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A)–(E).
183. Edwards v. DoorDash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Charles, 872 F.3d 637, 639 (5th Cir. 2017);
9 U.S.C. § 16(b), (a)(3)).
184. Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 839 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Gittins v.
MetroPCS Tex., LLC, No. 13-17-00619-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11597, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Dec. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Gittins, the motion
to compel arbitration was granted, and litigation abated; therefore, there was no final
award giving the appellate court jurisdiction over an appeal. Id. at *4.
185. Griggs, 905 F.3d at 840.
186. Id. at 839.
187. Id. at 845.
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a partial final award as to their jurisdiction to hear the claim.188 On ap-
peal, appellee argued that the Dallas Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction
because the trial court did not make a “final decision with respect to an
arbitration.”189 However, under FAA Section 16(a)(1)(D)–(E), the court
of appeals held that it had jurisdiction because the trial court expressly
denied the companies’ motion to confirm the tribunal’s “Partial Final
Award,” which effectively vacated that award and made it a final, appeal-
able order.190
B. LACK OF JURISDICTION
During the Survey period there were many issues connected to the
court’s lacking jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award or lacking juris-
diction to compel arbitration. Cases discussed issues pertaining to the ap-
pellate requirement of having a final order from the trial court, the
location of the hearing giving jurisdiction to the state courts, and volun-
tary dismissal subsequently stripping the court of jurisdiction. The conse-
quences of a court not having jurisdiction can be the denial of arbitration
as the chosen method for dispute resolution. A case on point is Shillin-
glaw v. Baylor University, where the claimant voluntarily non-suited his
claims in the trial court before the court granted the motion to compel
arbitration.191 However, because the claims had already been non-suited,
the court lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration.192
In SM Architects, PLLC v. AMX Veteran Specialty Services, LLC, ap-
pellants moved for the trial court to review the arbitration panel’s denial
of a motion to dismiss the arbitration proceedings based on the “failure”
to submit a proper certificate of merit.193 However, when there is no final
order on a motion to compel, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to de-
cide on the interlocutory matters unless there is a statute giving the ap-
pellate court jurisdiction to hear the appeal.194 Here, the Dallas Court of
Appeals concluded that the right to immediate interlocutory appeal
granted by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 150.002 for
claims requiring a certificate of merit did not confer jurisdiction on the
court of appeals to review an order rendered by an arbitration panel.195
Additionally, because the TAA does not provide an alternative means for
188. Signature Pharm., L.L.C. v. Ranbaxy, Inc., No. 05-17-00412-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1827, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 12, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
189. Id. at *13.
190. Id. at *16.
191. Shillinglaw v. Baylor Univ., No. 05-17-00498-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4611, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
192. Id. at *12.
193. SM Architects, PLLC v. AMX Veteran Specialty Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 902, 903
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.).
194. See, e.g., Thomas v. Std. Cas. Co., No. 02-17-00335-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS
11669, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 14, 2017, pet. withdrawn) (mem. op.). Appel-
lant did not establish that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate; therefore, Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code Sections 171.021 and 171.098(a)(1) did not give the appellate
court jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id.
195. SM Architects, PLLC, 564 S.W.3d at 907.
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judicial review, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the inter-
locutory appeal.196
Other issues regarding the requirement for a final order occurred dur-
ing the Survey period. In particular, mandamus relief is generally unavail-
able for orders compelling arbitration because the moving party often has
an adequate remedy by appealing the final judgment.197 However, in In
re Ron, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals highlighted an excep-
tion to this general rule: when the order compelling arbitration is void for
lack of jurisdiction.198 In this case, a trial court granted a motion to com-
pel arbitration of multiple disputes, including some issues related to a
divorce settlement. Appellant argued that the trial court did not have ju-
risdiction to compel arbitration over aspects of the divorce settlement be-
cause those provisions were in the exclusive jurisdiction of the family
court. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the order was void and
granting mandamus relief to the claims regarding the validity of the di-
vorce settlement and the child custody arrangement; all other claims were
sent to arbitration.199
Additional issues arose during the Survey period regarding location of
the arbitration proceedings. The courts of the state in which the arbitra-
tion was held have jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the award. Therefore,
if there is a dispute as to the hearing location, jurisdictional issues also
arise. In EcoClean USA, Inc. v. Geneon Technicians, LLC, appellants ar-
gued that the arbitration agreement became enforceable because the ar-
bitration was not held at a “mutually agreed upon location” as required
in the agreement.200 Additionally, because the agreement did not specify
that arbitration was to occur in Texas, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
confirm the award.201 However, because the arbitration agreement pro-
vided that the AAA would determine the location for arbitration if the
parties could not agree, which occurred in this case, this made arbitration
in Texas proper, giving Texas courts jurisdiction to confirm the award.202
C. GROUNDS FOR VACATUR
There are no common-law grounds for vacating an arbitration award
under either the FAA or the TAA.203 Instead both acts, enumerate spe-
196. Id.
197. In re Ron, No. 14-18-00711-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8702, at *9 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (orig. proceeding).
198. Id. at *1.
199. See id. at *18.
200. EcoClean USA, Inc. v. Geneon Techs., LLC, No. 04-17-00177-CV, 2017 Tex. App.
LEXIS 11313, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
201. Id. at *7.
202. See id. at *6.
203. The common-law claim of manifest-disregard for the law is no longer a basis by
which a court can vacate an arbitration award. See, e.g., C Tekk Sols., Inc. v. Sricom, Inc.,
No. 05-17-00845-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3052, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 1, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088.
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cific grounds to vacate an arbitration award.204
Under the FAA, an award may be vacated: (1) where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;205 (2) where there
was evidence of partiality or corruption in any of the arbitrators; (3)
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or other misbehavior
that prejudiced the rights of a party; or (4) where the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.206
The party seeking to vacate the award bears the burden of proof and
must timely serve a notice of the motion to vacate the award.207
1. Evident Partiality
“A neutral arbitrator selected by the parties exhibits evident partiality
if he ‘does not disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create
a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.’”208 In Novoa v.
Viramontes, the sole arbitrator had a long-standing and on-going business
relationship with a witness for respondents, leading the claimant to move
for the recusal of the arbitrator.209 The arbitrator denied the motion, stat-
ing that there was no doubt as to his impartiality or independence. Claim-
ant-appellant argued that this undisclosed relationship amounted to
evident partiality justifying the vacatur of the award. The El Paso Court
of Appeals held that claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence to va-
cate the award.210
In Prell v. Bowman, appellants argued that the arbitration award
should be vacated for evident partiality because the arbitrator was
Facebook friends with appellee.211 However, the court held that there
was not enough evidence to vacate the award for evident partiality be-
cause the arbitrator and appellee were engaged in the same business and
204. Holmes Builders at Castle Hills, Ltd. v. Gordon, No. 05-16-00887-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1572, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
205. No cases during the Survey period provided an example of this statutory vacatur
ground.
206. Thiessen v. Fid. Bank, No. 02-17-00321-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9338, at *1, *4
n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10); see
also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
207. See Craig v. Sw. Sec., Inc., No. 05-16-01378-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11741, at
*1, *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant did not meet the
three-month statute of limitations to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award in 9
U.S.C. § 12); see also Reitman v. Yandell, No. 02-17-00245-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
1941, at *1, *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Parker
v. United-Bilt Homes, LLC, No. 12-17-00054-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11564, at *1, *9
(Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (the trial court was required to
confirm the arbitration award because the homeowner did not attempt to demonstrate
grounds for vacating the arbitration award under either the FAA or the TAA).
208. Novoa v. Viramontes, 553 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (quot-
ing Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997)).
209. See id. at 49.
210. Id. at 54.
211. Prell v. Bowman, No. 05-17-00369-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3970, at *1, *20
(Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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being Facebook friends was not enough to create a reasonable impression
of partiality.212
2. Failure to Postpone the Hearing, Hear Evidence, or Any Other
Prejudicial Misbehavior
Appellant in Dominguez v. Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C. made multiple
arguments for vacating the arbitrator’s award.213 Appellant argued that
the award should be vacated because he was forced to participate in the
arbitration without appellee answering his discovery requests and be-
cause the arbitrator refused to postpone the arbitration when appellant
filed a motion in the trial court to set aside the order compelling arbitra-
tion. The First Houston Court of Appeals overruled both these argu-
ments and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration
award.214
3. Exceeded Powers
During the Survey period, the most common argument for vacatur was
that the arbitrators exceeded their authority in rendering the award. The
arbitrator’s authority is created by the parties’ arbitration agreement.215
Arbitration agreements give wide latitude to the arbitrator, and other
agreements limit the arbitrator’s authority to specific decisions.216 “Arbi-
trators exceed their powers when they decide matters not properly before
them or where the resulting award is not rationally inferable from the
parties’ agreement.”217 The TAA further restricts court review stating:
“[t]he fact that the relief granted by the arbitrators could not or would
not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award.”218 Therefore, because the courts give
wide deference to arbitrators and the statutes limit courts’ ability to re-
view the award, an argument for exceeded power rarely leads to a va-
cated award.219
212. See id. at *21.
213. Dominguez v. Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C., No. 01-17-00332-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4667, at *1, *5–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
214. See id. at *8.
215. Constr. Fin. Servs. v. Douzart, No. 09-16-00035-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1551,
at *1, *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Arbitrator fash-
ioned an equitable remedy, which was not prohibited by the arbitration agreement; thus,
the arbitrator did not exceed her authority.).
216. See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2011).
217. Holmes Builders at Castle Hills, Ltd. v. Gordon, No. 05-16-00887-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1572, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (The phrase
“(a) All applicable Federal and State law . . . shall apply” and “(b) All applicable claims,
causes of action, remedies and defenses that would be available in court shall apply” did
not limit the power of the arbitrator.).
218. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.090.
219. See, e.g., Pasadera Builders, LP v. Hughes, No. 04-17-00021-CV, 2017 Tex. App.
LEXIS 11538, at *1, *9–10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (The arbitration agreement did not contain any language specifically foreclosing the
panel from determining that neither party was a prevailing party, and since the panel was
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In Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Constables Association, the ar-
bitrator interpreted the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
the county and its deputy constables.220 The arbitrator determined that
the county violated the agreement when it eliminated several deputy con-
stable positions without regard for seniority of the officers. The county
appealed with their motion to vacate, arguing that the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his authority by “essentially controlling the budgetary process re-
served by law in this instance to the county government.”221 The county
argued that, according to the CBA, they had the right to “abolish” posi-
tions as part of their duty to create the budget, and that the seniority
system was for layoffs, not the abolishment of a position as a whole.222
The Texas Supreme Court reiterated the narrowness of the grounds for
vacating an arbitration award, holding that even if the arbitrator misinter-
preted the CBA, the arbitrator’s award could not be vacated on a mistake
of law because the arbitrator acted within his powers.223
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly gave defer-
ence to the arbitrator’s decision in Delek Refining, Ltd. v. Local 202,
United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industries & Service Workers International Union.224 The CBA required
union workers be given first opportunity for work over contract workers
and gave the arbitrator “jurisdiction and authority to interpret and apply
the provisions in the determination of such grievance but he shall not
have jurisdiction or authority to add to or alter in any way the provisions
of this Contract.”225 The Fifth Circuit recognized that sections of the
CBA were conflicting, leading to an ambiguity; however, the Fifth Circuit
not specifically foreclosed from making that finding, the panel “did not act in direct contra-
vention of the agreement or exceed its powers.”); Miller v. Walker, No. 02-17-00035-CV,
2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313, at *1, *16–17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.)
(holding that the award of attorney’s fees was within the arbitrator’s authority and the trial
court erred in modifying the award to vacate the award of attorney’s fees); Belfiore Devel-
opers, LLP v. Sampieri, No. 01-17-00847-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1671, at *1, *23–24
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Because “the evidence
demonstrated that the liquidated damages were a reasonable forecast” of the seller’s dam-
ages, the arbitrators did not exceed their authority); Acra v. Bonaudo, No. 05-17-00451-
CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4987, at *1, *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (the arbitration agreement did not create Nafta Traders increased judicial re-
view); Long Lake, Ltd. v. Pillittere, No. 14-17-00373-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6452, at
*1, *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (argument that
the arbitrator disregarded a contractual limitation failed because of inadequate evidentiary
support); Midani v. Smith, No. 09-18-00009-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8954, at *1, *15–16
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[T]he attorney and law
firm’s contentions that the arbitrator incorrectly decided the case could not be character-
ized as an assertion that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.”).
220. Jefferson Cty. v. Jefferson Cty. Constables Ass’n, 546 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex. 2018).
This case was reviewed under common law principles because the parties were arguing
over a collective bargaining agreement to which the Texas General Arbitration Act does
not apply. Id. at 665.
221. Id. at 664.
222. Id. at 673.
223. Id. at 674.
224. 891 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2018).
225. Id. at 569 (internal quotations omitted).
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held that the arbitrator acted within his powers in interpreting the
CBA.226
One unique case during the Survey period was Famsa, Inc. v. Bexar
Appraisal District.227 Here, the arbitrator derived his power from the
Property Tax Code as opposed to an arbitration agreement.228 Appellant
argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by assigning the burden
of proof to appellants. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
statute did not specify which party had the burden of proof, therefore any
potential error in assigning the burden to one party or the other would be
a mistake of law which the court could not review.229 Therefore, the court
of appeals held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in assigning
the burden of proof to appellants.230
D. MODIFICATION OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
Similar to the grounds for vacating an arbitration award, a motion to
modify an award is limited to statutory grounds. The TAA authorizes
trial courts to correct or modify arbitration awards for “an evident miscal-
culation of numbers” or “mistake in the description of a person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.”231 An award may also be modified if
the arbitrators “made an award with respect to a matter not submitted to
them” or if the “form of the award is imperfect in a manner not affecting
the merits of the controversy.”232
In Rassouli v. National Signs Holding, LLC, on a motion to modify the
arbitration award, appellant argued that the arbitrator issued an award on
an issue not submitted and that there was an evident miscalculation in
determining a non-competition period or a “misinterpretation” of the
closing date of the non-competition period.233 The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals disposed of the first argument because appellant had
informally submitted the dispute to the arbitrator. Second, the court of
appeals clarified that the statute required an “evident miscalculation of
numbers” and appellant’s argument was a miscalculation of dates.234 Ad-
ditionally, the misinterpretation of the closing date also could not be mod-
ified because it was not a mistake in describing the date.235 The court of
appeals held that the trial court did not err in failing to modify the arbi-
226. Id. at 573.
227. No. 04-17-00672-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3242, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
May 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 7.
230. Id. (interpreting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41A.09(b)).
231. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1)(A)–(B). The FAA has simi-
lar grounds for modification. See 9 U.S.C. § 11.
232. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.091(a)(2)–(3).
233. Rassouli v. Nat’l Signs Holding, LLC, No. 14-15-00353-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS
11651, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
234. Id. at *13.
235. Id. at *14.
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tration award.236
In contrast, the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Construction Financial
Services v. Douzart held that the trial court’s modification of the arbitra-
tor’s award of attorney’s fees by imposing joint and several liability was
proper because it “did not affect the merits” of the arbitrator’s decision
under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 171.091(B)(3).237
V. CONCLUSION
The Survey period found numerous Texas and federal courts consider-
ing issues arising out of arbitration. Though the courts did not decide any
cases of first impression, the cases provided additional discussion of a
number of arbitration issues as well as some unique nuances rarely dis-
cussed in courts.
236. Id. at *15–16.
237. Constr. Fin. Servs. v. Douzart, No. 09-16-00035-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1551,
at *1, *16–17 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
